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IN THE SUPREME CQU,RT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
.1. SEAL, 
Plain.tiff nnd Appellnnt, 
vs. 
TAYCO INC., 
' Defendant and Respondent. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
Case 
No. 
10171 
''AMSCO" WAS NOT LIABLE FOR SPECIAL DAMAGES 
UNDER THE EXPRE,SS TERMS OF iT'HE CONT'RAIGT IN 
QUESTION AND THE DAMAGES AWARDED TO R!ESPON-
DENT BY THE DISPUTED OFFSiET WAS FOR S1PEGIAL 
DAMAGES. 
Respondent has failed to advance any meaning 
whatsoever for the exculpatory sentence involved in this 
case and asks this Court to interpret the paragraph 
in question as having exactly the same meaning without 
it a~ with it in. Such construction is, of course, contrary 
to law. 
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In 12 Am. J ur., (Contracts) Section 241 it states the 
law as follows : 
"Such an interpretation must be adopted as 
will render the whole agreement operative, if it 
can, consistently and reasonably be done. So far 
as possible effect will be given to all the language 
and to every clause of the agreement. No word 
should be rejected as mere surplusage if the court 
can discover any reaso_nable purpose· thereof 
which can be gathered from the whole instru-
ment. An interpretation which gives reasonable 
meaning to all its provisions will be preferred 
to one which leaves a portion of the writing use-
less or inexplicable. Only when parts of a written 
agreement are S'O radically repugnant that there 
is no rational interpretation that will render them 
effective and accordant must any part perish." 
Realizing this ~Court would probably ~~ie. to 
eliminate entirely the exculpatory sentence in question, 
Respondent seeks to avoid its application in this case 
on the grounds that the damage·s allowed in the disputed 
offset weTe not in fact special damages. 
:The main reason for distinguishing between general 
and spe'cial damages relates to the necessity to plead the 
special circumstances on which the latter are based in 
in order to be recoverable. If a party entitled to dam-
ages has suffered a loss greater than would normally 
follow a breach of contract because of special cir'Cum-
stances (such as the loss of profits on an exist:irig con-
tract, as here) and these circumstances were known to 
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the other party whPn the contract was formed, these ad-
ditional damages are recoverable if properly pleaded. 
Thore is no question of proper pleading of Respondent's 
los~ of profit, but could the respondent have recovered 
for them ( setting aside for the moment the effect of the 
Pxculpatory contract limitation) if they had not been 
specially pleaded¥ If not, they are special damages and 
within the contract exclusion in question. 
In 15 Am. J ur. (Damages), Sec. 321, it states: 
"One who desires to recover for loss of pro-
spective profits for breach of a contract must 
allege the facts and circumstan'ces and knowledge 
of the situation brought home to the other party 
at the time the contract was entered into." 
(citing Goodwin & Southern R. Co., 125 Ga. 630, S.E. 720) 
Respondent appears to classify as special damages 
only those that are so speculative and remote, arising 
out of possible future business, that they would not be 
recoverable regardless of how expressly they were 
pleaded. 
The fact that the mnount re'coverable as special 
drunages is necessarily greater and in addition to general 
drunages is the very reason why a seller who can not 
guarantee a delivery date because the goods must be 
manufactured needs to eliminate exposure as to them 
l'n~n in ordinary circumstances although willing, as here, 
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to assume liability for the usual damages except where 
the causes of delay are extraordinary. 
The trial judge recognized that the damages sought 
to be offset were special and so denominated them in his 
instructions (R 70, 71). 
Footnote number 18 to the authority cited by Re-
spondent on this point (15 Am. Jur. (Damages) Sec. 152 
says: 
"No court in modern times, howsoever ex-
treme may be its holding, permits the recovery 
of prospective profits as special damages unless 
they came within the limits laid down in Hadley 
vs. Boxendale." American R .Exp. Co. vs. Stein-
berg, 208 Ky. 251, 270 S.W. 756, 42 ALR 705. 
(Underscoring added) 
POINr II 
THE CONTR.A!CT OF SALE DID NOT 'PROVIDE FOR 
DELIVER.Y BY A'PRIL 15, 1957, AND ISO WAS NOT 
BR,E.A:CHED BY APRIL 10, 1957. 
Appellant does not quarrel with the law cited by 
Respondent to the effect that questions concerning the 
existence of and bre,ach of contract are jury questions 
when the facts are in dispute. Here, however, the facts 
are not in dispute and Respondent has failed to point 
out in the record any evidence that "AMSCO" had 
agreed to a delivery date of April 1st. Certainly none 
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o i' the documentary evidence shows it and Mr. ~Taylor's 
t i'stimony that !\l r. Welch said after February 22, 1957, 
'' Eh· would do his best to rneet the April15, 1957 deadline" 
would not supply any such· proof for good businesses 
ahvays sePk custmner satisfaction beyond their legal 
1 inhility. 
POINT III 
THE CONTRACT WAS CANCELLED BY MUTUAL CON-
SENT. 
Respondent contends that any evidence of an agree-
Inl'nt of recession and consideration to support it is "com-
pletely lacking in this case." Appellant submits that 
Exhibit 9, the letter of May 4, 1957, from Mr. Taylor to 
A~1SCO containing "Please ... cancel our order No. 
7144 for Palisades Contractors" and Mr. Taylor's testi-
mony that "AJ\1:SCO" never billed for these tract shoes 
( H-W, 4:7) and that he "considered I had canceUed it 
and I didn't do any more about it" (R 59} although he 
saw "Al\ISCO's" representative about monthly for near-
ly two years thereafter (64, R 67), all of which was cited 
in the Brief of Appellant, clearly established a mutual 
agreement to cancel the order and a mutual agreement 
to rescind an executory contract provides adequate legal 
consideration as each party thereby suffers a legal detri-
ment in giving up his rights to performance or damages 
from the other (17 C.J.S. (1Contracts) Sec 391). There 
wa~ no conflict in the evidence on this point to make it 
a jury question so its submission to the jury was error. 
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POINT IV 
MITIGATION OF DAMAGES. 
:This point is abandoned by appellant since not raised 
in the trial court. 
POINT V 
TTME OF ESS!ENOE. 
This point is abandoned by appellant since not raised 
in the trial court. 
POINT VI 
'.DHE .A:MOUNT OF OFFSE'T ALLOWE'D BY THE JURY 
IN EX!CE!SS OF $1,694.40 W .A!S NOT SUPPORTED BY THE 
EVIrDEN'CE. 
All of the evidence of this point was documentary 
and the only possible difference in the price of the track 
shoes payable by the buyer in determining his profits 
would be whether the shoes ordered were the no•n skid 
type ($44.00/100# less discount/dozen) or not ($34.65/100 
less discount/ dozen) as quoted on EtXhihit 2 and all of 
the evidence on this point shows that the non skid type 
were ordered (Exhibit 3). Under these circumstances, 
it is not surprising that Respondent made no effort 
whatsoever to point to any evidence that would jusitfy 
the mnount of the jury award in this case. 
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CPrtainly this Court can not properly allow an award 
to stand which is not supported by the evidence merely 
bt>(•amw it is less than the ainount requested by the suc-
<'Pssful party as HPspondent argues on this point. 
CONOL,USION 
The contract in question absolved "AMSCO" of any 
liability for special damages and the offset of special 
drunages awarded R.espondent in the lower court should 
LH_' set aside and judgment entered for Appellant for the 
admitted liability of the account sued on. Even if this 
were not so, there was no contract by "AMS.CO" for 
delivery prior to the time of cancellation by Respondent's 
assignor or any such contract was rescinded by mutual 
consent so the result should be the same. 
Even if Appellant is in error as to the above con-
clusions, the judgment should be increased to $1,790.62 
plus interest since no evidence supported any offset in 
t'xeess of $1,694.40. 
R.espectfully submitted, 
HANSEN & SUMSTON 
65 East 4th South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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